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Note
Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang:
How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic
Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives
Jennifer L. Vainik∗
Steven Van Keuren and Teri Lee dated for two years before
their relationship ended.1 On July 29th, 2006, Van Keuren
broke into Lee’s home in Stillwater, Minnesota.2 Wielding
butcher knives in both hands, Van Keuren attacked Lee,
screaming that “‘the only way he could be together’ with her
was to kill her.”3 Lee threw chairs at him as he advanced, and
shielded herself with one to block his slashing.4 Incredibly, Lee
managed to fend off Van Keuren, whom police later arrested at
his home in River Falls, Wisconsin.5
At Van Keuren’s August 1st, 2006 bail hearing, Lee told
the judge, “I do feel physically threatened . . . . There’s no doubt
in my mind that he will come back to my home. He’s stated . . .
that he had nothing left to live for.”6 Despite Lee’s fears, the
judge released Van Keuren on bail, ordering him to stay “at
least a mile away” from Lee.7 The no-contact order did not stop
Van Keuren from terrorizing Lee.8 On September 20th, 2006,
∗ J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
Northwestern University. The author thanks Professors Beverly Balos, Dale
Carpenter, and Stephen Cribari for their insight and guidance, the outstanding editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, and Sam Ives, Judi
Vainik, and Ron Vainik for their loving support. Copyright © 2007 by Jennifer
L. Vainik.
1. Sue Turner, Intruder Kills Two, Then Shot by SWAT Team, WCCOTV, Sept. 22, 2006, http://wcco.com/local/local_story_265092706.html.
2. Alex Friedrich, She Cried for Help. Did Anyone Listen?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Van Keuren attended Lee’s young daughter’s volleyball game.9
Lee repeatedly notified the police, but officers never arrested
Van Keuren for violating the order.10
Around four o’clock in the morning on September 22nd,
2006, Van Keuren broke into Lee’s home once again.11 Lee, her
boyfriend, Tim Hawkinson, Sr.,12 and her four young children—
ages six to twelve—were asleep inside.13 Using a .22 caliber
handgun, Van Keuren shot and killed Lee and Hawkinson in
their bedroom.14 One of Lee’s daughters witnessed the murders
before fleeing with her sister to a neighbor’s home.15 Meanwhile, Lee’s two sons hid in the home for ninety minutes until
the police apprehended Van Keuren.16
Sadly, days before she was killed, Lee had started the
process of installing a security system in her home.17 The Lees
had created an evacuation plan to be implemented if Van
Keuren arrived at their home,18 and Hawkinson stayed overnight to protect the family.19 Anticipating the worst, Lee implored her sister to take care of her kids if Van Keuren killed
her.20 The four Lee children are currently living with Lee’s sister and her husband, who have three children of their own.21
This Note argues that current approaches to disarming
batterers are ineffective and place women like Teri Lee in grave
danger despite victims’ earnest efforts to seek protection. Part I
explains the gendered nature of domestic violence and explores
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Turner, supra note 1.
12. Alex Friedrich, Couple Had Gun but Didn’t Shoot It, Spent Cartridges
Match Ammo Found at Suspect’s Home, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 3,
2006, at B1.
13. Turner, supra note 1.
14. Friedrich, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Sue Turner, Murder Victims Knew Ex-Boyfriend Would Return,
WCCO-TV, Sept. 25, 2006, http://wcco.com/topstories/local_story_267200050
.html.
18. Id.
19. Turner, supra note 1.
20. Shooting Victim’s Sister Says She Knew Life Was Threatened, MINN.
PUB. RADIO, Sept. 24, 2006, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/
09/24/domestic.
21. Elliot Mann, Lee Children Adjust to Life After Mother’s Passing,
STILLWATER GAZETTE (Minn.), Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.stillwatergazette
.com/articles/2007/01/26/news/news200.txt.
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the negative consequences of making the states primarily responsible for gun violence against women. Part II analyzes how
recent federal attempts to correct the inadequacies of state approaches to gun violence unacceptably fail to establish a consistent, national approach to disarming batterers. After examining constitutionally permissible uses of federal power to secure
state action, Part III concludes that Congress could more effectively disarm batterers by amending federal laws to include
three new provisions. Specifically, federal law should provide
monetary incentives to the states to enact the federal gun bans
as state statutes, fund the creation of locally operated gun units
for the purposes of identifying and disarming batterers, and require states to report information about batterers to federal law
enforcement authorities.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, GUNS, AND GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIBILITY
Tragically, the terror the Lee family experienced cannot be
characterized as an anomaly. Women routinely experience violence at the hands of their intimate partners.22 Any solution to
domestic violence must take into account how abuse affects
women and men differently, as well as the government’s role in
both ameliorating and perpetuating the disproportionate effects
of domestic violence on women and men.
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFINED
The American Medical Association defines domestic violence as “the physical, sexual, and/or psychological abuse to an
individual perpetrated by a current or former intimate partner.”23 Alternatively referred to as “wife battering” or “intimate
partner abuse,” domestic violence describes a pattern of control
that becomes more dangerous with time,24 because batterers
22. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Women Face Greatest Threat of Violence at
Home, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A7 (“Violence against women
by their live-in spouses or partners is a widespread phenomenon, both in the
developed and the developing world . . . .”); see also Bob Herbert, Why Aren’t
We Shocked?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A19 (“The disrespectful, degrading,
contemptuous treatment of women is so pervasive and so mainstream that it
has just about lost its ability to shock.”).
23. Michael A. Rodriguez et al., Screening and Intervention for Intimate
Partner Abuse: Practices and Attitudes of Primary Care Physicians, 282 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 468, 468 (1999).
24. Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2005).
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display high rates of recidivism and because the severity of the
abuse tends to intensify.25 Thus, once physical or psychological
intimidation begins it usually escalates, becoming more frequent and severe.26
While the term “domestic violence” connotes gender neutrality,27 statistics show that domestic violence affects men and
women in vastly different ways.28 The U.S. Department of Justice reports that eighty-five percent of victims of intimatepartner domestic violence are women.29 Furthermore, 63.5% of
female homicide victims are killed by intimate partners, as
compared to 36.5% of male homicide victims.30 Most violence
that men experience occurs in public spaces, committed by
male acquaintances or male strangers.31 In stark contrast,
women are most likely to encounter violence in their own
homes,32 perpetrated not by strangers, but by men whom the
women intimately know and love.33 These men are often
women’s long-term partners and the fathers of their children.34
B. WHEN BATTERERS POSSESS GUNS
While all forms of domestic violence are potentially lethal,
25. Id. at 3–4.
26. See id. at 4 (“Without active police or court intervention, recurrence
and intensification of the abuse are even more certain.”).
27. See Rodriguez et al., supra note 23, at 468.
28. See Susan B. Sorenson, Firearm Use in Intimate Partner Violence: A
Brief Overview, 30 EVALUATION REV. 229, 229 (2006) (noting that two primary
differences between the homicides of men and women are the place of the
homicide and the nature of the victim-suspect relationship).
29. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE 1993–2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf; see also Lauren E. Crais, Domestic Violence and the Federal
Government, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 405, 406 (2005) (“[M]ore than 960,000 incidents of domestic violence occur each year, and about eighty-five percent of
the victims are women.”).
30. JAMES ALAN FOX & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf.
31. Sorenson, supra note 28, at 229.
32. See id. at 230 (“In recent years, intimate partner homicides composed
only 4% of the murders of men but about one third of the murders of women.”);
see also Rosenthal, supra note 22 (citing a 2006 study by the World Health Organization which found that at six research sites around the world at least
fifty percent of women were subject to moderate or severe violence in the
home).
33. See Sorenson, supra note 28, at 230.
34. See id. (noting that women’s abusers are often their intimate partners,
whether boyfriends or husbands).
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studies show that guns and domestic violence are a particularly
deadly combination.35 The Department of Justice reports that
nationwide, two-thirds of intimate-partner homicide victims
are killed by guns.36 If a batterer possesses a firearm the likelihood that he will murder his girlfriend or wife increases substantially.37 Intimate assaults involving firearms are twelve
times more likely to end in fatality than assaults not associated
with firearms.38
Even when batterers do not actually fire their guns, they
still use guns to control women.39 Abused women frequently report that their intimate partners brandish guns to threaten
deadly force.40 In the face of such threats, women are more
likely to endure long-term abuse out of fear that leaving the relationship will result in their death or the death of their children.41

35. Amy Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A
Deadly Combination, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 2005, at 79, 79 (2005); see also May,
supra note 24, at 4 (“If firearms remain in a household with a history of domestic violence, the risk of death or firearm injury to the victim increases
dramatically.”); Emily J. Sack, Confronting the Issue of Gun Seizure in Domestic Violence Cases, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 3, 3 (2005) (noting
that (1) firearms caused 44% of the 61 homicides related to domestic violence
in San Diego County between 1997 and 2003; (2) in the late 1990s the New
York State Commission on Domestic Violence Fatalities concluded that firearms were used in more than half of the domestic violence homicides it investigated; and (3) in Washington State, 60% of the 209 victims of domestic violence homicides from January 1997 to August 2002 were killed with a
firearm).
36. Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 79; May, supra note 24, at 4;
Sack, supra note 35, at 3.
37. See May, supra note 24, at 4 (“Battered women are approximately five
times more likely than other women to be murdered in a shooting . . . .”).
38. Id.
39. Casey Gwinn, Domestic Violence and Firearms: Reflections of a Prosecutor, 30 EVALUATION REV. 237, 239 (2006) (“[O]ffenders use . . . guns to intimidate and threaten their female victims even if they never shoot. In fact,
the most common use of a firearm in the home of a batterer may well be to
threaten the female victim.”); Sorenson, supra note 28, at 235 (“Firearms are
used in ways that do not result in firearm-related injuries. A gun can be used
to coerce behaviors such as sex, as a means to inflict terror, and so on.”).
40. See Gwinn, supra note 39, at 239; Sorenson, supra note 28, at 235
(speculating that handguns may be more common in homes where battering
occurs than in the general population).
41. See Gwinn, supra note 39, at 239 (observing that an abuser’s threats
to “use his firearm on her, on the children and on himself ” convinced the victim to stay in the abusive relationship); Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at
79 (noting that the domestic violence perpetrator “threatened to kill [his victim] every time she tried to leave him”).
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C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND GUNS
1. Understanding the State Sovereignty Paradigm
In order to determine the best strategy to prevent gun violence against women, policymakers should consider how the
doctrine of federalism apportions government responsibility for
this issue. Historically, states have been responsible for addressing domestic relations. As the Supreme Court stated in In
re Burrus, “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
[s]tates and not to the laws of the United States.”42 Federalism
doctrine favors state power over domestic relations for two reasons.43 First, the Tenth Amendment preserves the states’ traditional power to regulate the family.44 Second, as smaller political units, the states are more “in tune” with local mores.45 As a
result, the states can best enact laws that shape domestic relations to reflect the values of their constituents. The states’ presumptive legislative and adjudicative authority over domestic
relations is known as the state sovereignty paradigm.46
United States v. Morrison47 provides a modern example of
federalism’s preference for state control of domestic relations.
In Morrison, the Court declared unconstitutional a provision of
the Violence Against Women Act that allowed victims of violence to sue their abusers for civil remedies in federal courts.48
In so doing, the Court limited the federal government’s ability
to offer a national solution to domestic violence. Morrison held
that if Congress could regulate domestic violence through the
Commerce Clause, the distinction between what is “local” and
what is “national” would be “negatively blurred.”49 The Court
characterized domestic relations—including the violence that
42. 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
43. See Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of
Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
1761, 1763–64 (2005).
44. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1764.
45. See Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
197, 199 (1999) (“Regulation of the family, the thinking goes, is better-suited to
the states because states are the locus of community dialogues on questions of
values.”); Collins, supra note 43, at 1764.
46. See Collins supra note 43, at 1770–71.
47. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
48. Id. at 627.
49. Id. at 617–18.
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may accompany those relations—as a “local matter” best resolved by the states, rather than a national civil rights problem
necessitating a federal remedy.50
However, the states’ power to control domestic relations is
not absolute. Constitutional protections limit the state sovereignty paradigm, including the right of privacy protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.51 The Court first recognized a right of
privacy in marital relationships in Griswold v. Connecticut, asserting that the State cannot enter “the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms.”52 The Court extended the right of privacy to
individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird,53 and reaffirmed the right in
Roe v. Wade.54 In Roe, the Court noted that precedent extends
the right of privacy to “activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.”55 While domestic relations fall under the jurisdiction of the states, constitutional privacy rights limit the extent
to which states may regulate such relationships.
Courts’ reluctance to permit government intervention in
the home—even when the home is the site of extreme violence—evidences the significance of privacy rights within the
home. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, the Court held that state authorities had no affirmative responsibility to protect a toddler from his abusive father.56
County social workers were aware of the child abuse, but took
no action to remove the boy from his father’s custody.57 The
boy’s father subsequently beat him so severely that he suffered

50. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United
States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 138 (2000) (contending that if the
Violence Against Women Act had been upheld, it would have “[l]ocat[ed] acts
of gender-based violence under the rubric of civil rights”).
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
52. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
53. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971) (“If the right to privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion . . . .”).
54. 410 U.S. at 152 (“In a line of decisions . . . the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy . . . does exist under the Constitution.” (citation omitted)).
55. Id. at 152–53 (citations omitted).
56. 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests . . . .”).
57. Id. at 192–93.
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permanent brain injuries.58 The Court asserted that while the
Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from the state, it does
not protect citizens from each other.59 Consequently, the State
had no responsibility to protect the boy from his violent father.60 Furthermore, the state authorities’ knowledge of the
abuse did not rise to the level of “state action” that necessitates
constitutional protection.61
Together, the privacy cases and DeShaney suggest that
while the Constitution limits a state’s ability to regulate private relationships, it does not require that a state intervene
when such relationships are violent. Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales62 demonstrates the impact of this interpretation of
the scope of state authority. In this case, Jessica Gonzales’s exhusband took their three young daughters from their home
while they were playing outside, despite the fact that a restraining order prohibited him from seeing the family unless he
arranged a visit.63 Jessica repeatedly called the police and even
went to the police station, but the officers did not locate and return her children.64 Later, Mr. Gonzales shot the three children
to death.65 Jessica filed a claim, stating that the police violated
her property interest in the enforcement of her restraining order.66 Justice Scalia rejected her argument, stating, “[w]e do
not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement of the restraining orders mandatory,”67 and reasoning that “[t]he procedural component of the Due Process Clause
does not protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit.’”68 According to Gonzales, even a specific legislative mandate to enforce restraining orders does not compel state au58. Id. at 193.
59. Id. at 196 (“Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
affords protection against unwarranted government interference . . . , it does
not confer an entitlement to such [government aid] as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.” (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 317–18 (1980))).
60. Id. at 197 (“[A] State’s failure to protect an individual against private
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”).
61. Id. at 199–200 (contending that “state action” occurs when a state
takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will).
62. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
63. Id. at 751.
64. Id. at 753–54.
65. Id. at 754.
66. Id. at 748.
67. Id. at 760.
68. Id. at 756.
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thorities to intervene in domestic relations.69
The extent of the states’ power to regulate domestic relations affects women and men differently. This disparity stems
from the belief that the “public” sphere of industry, commerce
and government is distinctly separate from the “private” sphere
of the home.70 In addition, the public and private spheres are
gendered.71 Historically, women have been associated with the
home since women traditionally undertook homemaking and
childbearing responsibilities.72 In contrast, the public sphere is
usually portrayed as “masculine,” since men traditionally acted
as breadwinners and authority figures in the public domain.73
The gender inequality inherent in the traditional construction of the public and private spheres affects the degree to
which the government can intervene in domestic affairs and,
consequently, domestic violence.74 Both the federal and state
governments may regulate the commercial, contractual, and
governmental transactions that occur in the (male) public
sphere.75 In contrast, the state sovereignty paradigm rejects
the possibility of federal intervention in the home76 and the
Constitution limits the extent of state regulation of the home.77
Consequently, the state sovereignty paradigm renders women
unprotected in the private sphere of the home.78 By guarding
69. See id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that
the Colorado law at issue in Gonzales required police to enforce restraining
orders in an effort to correct the historical problem of police inaction in the
face of domestic disputes. Id. at 775–76.
70. KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 5 (2003).
71. Id. at 33.
72. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (“The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.”); KELLY, supra note 70, at 33.
73. See KELLY, supra note 70, at 33.
74. See Adler, supra note 45, at 256 (“[U]nderlying federal denial of the
responsibility for family law are subliminal associations of federal law with
masculinity, rights, market norms, individualist self-reliance, objectivity, and
the public sphere; and state law with femininity, love, values, altruism, subjectivity, and the private sphere.”).
75. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (describing the
ability of the federal government to regulate economic activity that affects interstate commerce).
76. See, e.g., id. at 613–16; In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
77. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
78. See KELLY, supra note 70, at 34 (describing how “the designation of
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the home’s privacy, the government casts a blind eye on the
power imbalance between domestic partners.79 In effect, the
State becomes the guardian of the notion that “a man’s home is
his castle.”
2. Historic State Approaches to Domestic Violence
In addition to designating states as responsible for domestic relations, federalism doctrine also conceives of the states as
“laboratories” that test different legal “experiments.”80 While
some experiments will fail, others will succeed and serve as an
example for the rest of the country.81 In their role as laboratories, the states have historically devised a variety of approaches
to domestic violence. While some states prevented violence
against women,82 others condoned it.83
The earliest response to domestic violence in the United
States involved steps the colonies took to criminalize the behavior.84 In 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties stated that
“[e]verie marryed woeman shall be free from bodilie correction
or stripes by her husband, unlesse it be in his owne defence
upon her assault.”85 The Governor’s Council of Massachusetts
granted to at least nine battered women a legal separation with
no right to remarry.86 Similarly, the Plymouth Colony permitwomen as belonging to the private sphere” creates problems with domestic violence).
79. See id. (“[A] noninterventionist approach to domestic life has functioned to protect the privacy of men at the expense of the safety of women.”).
80. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the states’ role as “laboratories”); Wayne A. Logan, Creating a
“Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86
B.U. L. REV. 65, 84 & n.111 (2006) (recognizing that one of federalism’s core
values is the “ideal of democratic experimentalism and pluralism” wherein
states may “undertake ‘experiments without risk to the rest of the country’”
(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting))).
81. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Balance of Power Between the Federal
Government and the States, in NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS 111, 117–18 (Alan
Brinkley et al. eds., 1997).
82. See Elizabeth Felter, A History of the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, in FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 5, 8–10 (Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1997).
83. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157–58 (1824).
84. See Felter, supra note 82, at 8–9.
85. Id. at 9 (quoting ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING
OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 21–22 (1987)).
86. Id.
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ted one battered woman to live separately from her husband,
who was required to pay maintenance to her until he was “reformed.”87
While some states criminalized domestic violence, others
reinforced it as a permissible component of marriage. For example, in Bradley v. State, the court found that a husband may
“chastise” his wife so long as his “correction” is “reasonable.”88
Other courts justified this “right” on the basis of a man’s ability
to act freely within the privacy of his home. In State v. Black,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that unless “permanent injury or excessive violence” was involved, the law would
“not invade the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain.”89
Similarly, the court in State v. Rhodes observed that “family
government is recognized by law as being as complete in itself
as the [s]tate government is in itself . . . . Every household has
and must have, a government of its own, modelled to suit the
temper . . . of its inmates.”90 These opinions suggest that states’
reluctance to aid battered women derived from an assumption
that domestic affairs were beyond the reach of the states’ jurisdiction.91
3. Current State Approaches to Domestic Violence
Modern state law continues to reflect the historical disunity of the states’ stances toward domestic violence.92 An examination of state laws regarding gun ownership and domestic
violence illustrates the diversity of actions—as well as nonaction—states currently take to prevent gun violence against
women. Two mechanisms that states often use to disarm bat87. Id.
88. 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157–58 (1824).
89. 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 263–64 (1824), overruled by State v. Oliver, 70
N.C. 60 (1874), as recognized in Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp.,
515 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1999).
90. 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 456–57 (1868), overruled by Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, as
recognized in Virmani, 515 S.E.2d 675.
91. See, e.g., Bradley, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) at 158 (“Family broils and dissentions cannot be investigated before the tribunals of the country, without
casting a shade over the character of those who are unfortunately engaged in
the controversy.”); Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) at 456–57 (“[W]e will not interfere
with or attempt to control [the family government], in favor of either husband
or wife . . . .”).
92. See Anne Rousseve, Domestic Violence and the States, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 431, 432 (2005) (“Because there is no uniform codification of criminal
domestic violence on a national level, states vary significantly in their statutory organization of criminal domestic violence law.”).
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terers include allowing state courts to order firearm removal at
order for protection hearings and permitting police officers to
seize weapons when they respond to a domestic violence incident.93
Despite the danger guns pose to women nationwide, just
sixteen states allow their courts to disarm batterers at order for
protection hearings.94 Among these states, court approaches to
gun removal vary radically.95 For example, nine of the sixteen
states give judges discretion in deciding whether to include a
gun removal provision in the order.96 Furthermore, only two
states, North Carolina and California, require judges to notify
the parties that the respondent cannot possess firearms while
under the order.97 In other states, many victims may be unaware of the gun ban and therefore unlikely to notify the judge
that the respondent must be disarmed.98 In addition, some
states make weapon removal contingent on the actual use or
threatened use of a weapon in a domestic violence incident.99
States also vary on how to physically take away the guns pursuant to an order of protection. Five states authorize law enforcement to seize the guns.100 However, eleven states depend
on the abusers themselves to surrender their firearms.101
Like the laws governing court-ordered disarmament, those
concerning police removal are anything but uniform. Eighteen
states authorize police officers to confiscate firearms at the
93. See Shannon Frattaroli & Jon S. Vernick, Separating Batterers and
Guns: A Review and Analysis of Gun Removal Laws in 50 States, 30 EVALUATION REV. 296, 297 (2006).
94. See id. at 299.
95. See Sack, supra note 35, at 10 (noting that state gun bans “vary tremendously”).
96. Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307.
97. See id. at 308. (“California law requires courts to verbally inform both
parties in the proceedings that the respondent cannot possess firearms while
the order is in effect. . . . [I]n North Carolina, judges must ask if respondents
have access to firearms.”).
98. See Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 79 (“Many people are unaware of a 1996 federal law that prohibits a person with a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction from possessing . . . a firearm or ammunition . . . .”); Judy Harrison, Domestic Abuse Targeted by Gun Laws, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS (Me.), June 29, 2004, at B1 (positing that many people affected by
federal gun bans might have no idea the laws exist).
99. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307 (listing Arkansas, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania).
100. Id. at 307–08 (listing Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey).
101. Id. at 308.
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scene of a domestic violence incident.102 While some states require the police to confiscate firearms, others simply permit
removal.103 In addition, some states only allow police to take
guns if the accused abuser is arrested.104 Also, while some
states impose a blanket requirement that the police take “all
firearms” in the suspect’s possession,105 others only allow officers to take guns in “plain view” or discovered through a “consensual search.”106 A few states further limit the requirement
to only those firearms involved in the “incident at hand.”107
Even when the police are actually able to confiscate a weapon,
some states stipulate that the gun can only be held for a brief
period of time.108 Due to the inconsistencies and shortcomings
of state approaches to disarming batterers, recent federal legislation has attempted to address the issues of guns and domestic
violence.
4. Federal Approaches to Domestic Violence and Guns
While the states have addressed domestic violence since
the founding of the American colonies,109 the federal government has only recently acted to protect battered women. It was
not until the late 1970s that Congress first introduced two national domestic violence bills, both of which were defeated.110
The first federal law on domestic violence is only thirteen years
old—the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).111 This
102. Id. at 299.
103. See id. at 299, 306 (observing that eight states require police to remove firearms, seven states permit police to remove firearms, and three states
have ambiguous statutory language).
104. See id. at 306.
105. See id. (“Police gun removal laws apply to all firearms owned or possessed by the alleged batterer in nine states, provided other criteria . . . are
met.”).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 307 (“Six states . . . limit removal authority to firearms actually involved in the domestic violence incident.”); Sack, supra note 35, at 11
(listing Montana and Ohio as examples of states that only allow police to seize
guns that have been used or threatened to be used in the assault).
108. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307 (stating that the removal period is seven days or less in many states and that eight states do not
provide a specific time frame for return of the seized guns).
109. See Felter, supra note 82, at 8–9.
110. See Rachelle Brooks, Feminists Negotiate the Legislative Branch: The
Violence Against Women Act, in FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 82, at 65, 68.
111. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261 (LexisNexis 2006); see also Brooks, supra note 110,
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landmark piece of legislation created federal causes of action
for domestic violence victims and appropriated billions of dollars for battered women’s shelters and other resources.112
VAWA also attempted to overcome the shortcomings of state
gun laws by instituting federal measures to protect women
from gun violence.113
As part of VAWA, Congress passed two notable provisions
amending the Gun Control Act of 1968.114 The first, entitled the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, prohibits individuals subject to an order for protection from purchasing or possessing a firearm.115 The second, the Lautenberg
Amendment of 1996, declares that anyone convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor cannot possess or purchase a
firearm or ammunition.116 In the words of the late U.S. Senator
Paul Wellstone, the laws sought to recognize that the “only difference between a battered woman and a dead woman is the
presence of a gun.”117 In so doing, the laws attempted to protect
women and children by establishing a national commitment to
disarm batterers.118
While the federal gun bans were controversial from the
outset, the capacity of the laws to accomplish their goals came
under heavy scrutiny after Morrison. In light of Morrison’s re-

at 76–78 (describing VAWA’s passage and its relevant provisions).
112. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261; Brooks, supra note 110, at 65, 76–77 (arguing
that VAWA was “the most significant piece of legislation ever enacted on the
subject of domestic violence against women” in the United States).
113. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261; Michelle W. Easterling, For Better or Worse:
The Federalization of Domestic Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 940 (1996)
(“Congress . . . was apparently convinced that the states were not solving the
domestic violence problem, and that the federal government’s involvement was
needed.”); Editorial, Why Give Wife-Beaters Guns?, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996,
at A24 (referring to the need for legislation to “plug a potentially deadly gap”
since no state then banned “the possession of a gun by those convicted of misdemeanor domestic-violence crimes”).
114. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
115. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110401, 108 Stat. 2014, 2014–15 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000)).
116. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to -372 (1996) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000)).
117. 142 CONG. REC. S10378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone).
118. See id. (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (“The amendment . . . would . . .
send a message about our [n]ation’s commitment to ending domestic violence
and about our determination to protect the millions of women and children
who suffer from this abuse.”).
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iteration of the state sovereignty paradigm, many legal scholars predicted that federal judges would overturn the gun
bans.119 Scholars expected that judges would “characterize [federal domestic violence statutes] as ‘family law’ statutes and
then point to the warning language in Morrison . . . as evidence
of the statutes’ unconstitutionality.”120 Just as Morrison invalidated federal civil remedies for domestic violence, scholars predicted that courts would also overrule the gun bans since they
similarly mandated federal intervention in matters of “local
concern,” including the family, gun control, and criminal law.121
As legal scholars expected, courts considered numerous
constitutional objections to the gun provisions.122 Nevertheless,
courts repeatedly declared the federal gun bans constitutional.123 Notably, courts upheld the laws during a period of legislative and judicial relaxation of other gun control laws.124 Yet
although the gun laws were upheld, they have not proven to be
119. See Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison:
An Examination of the Child Support Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Outlawing Gun Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 137 (2002) (“If any of the remaining gun possession laws are subject to attack, the Lautenberg Amendment and [the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994] are
perfect targets because they combine two core areas of supposed traditional
state concern: family and criminal law.”).
120. Id. at 60.
121. See id. at 137–40.
122. See United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a due process challenge to the Lautenberg Amendment); Gillespie v. City
of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 698, 704–05 (7th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the
Lautenberg Amendment from the Gun-Free School Zones Act struck down in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), since the Lautenberg Amendment
contained a jurisdictional hook); United States v. Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60,
65 (D. Me. 2000) (finding that the Lautenberg Amendment has “both a specific
jurisdictional element as well as a substantial effect on interstate commerce”
and therefore is a “constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause”); see also T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FIREARMS
PROHIBITIONS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONVICTIONS: THE LAUTENBERG
AMENDMENT 5–9 (2001), available at http://www.peaceathomeshelter
.org/DV/readings/federal/lautenberg.pdf (summarizing.commerce clause, equal
protection clause, and ex post facto clause challenges to the Lautenberg
Amendment).
123. See Jessica A. Golden, Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the
Civilian and Military Contexts: Congressional Overreaching, Statutory Vagueness, Ex Post Facto Violations, and Implementational Flaws, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 427, 442 (2001).
124. See May, supra note 24, at 27 (“Thirty-six states currently allow their
citizens to carry concealed weapons, and at least five of those states passed
their laws [between 2004 and 2005].”).
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a successful means of addressing gun violence against women.
II. THE FEDERAL GUN BANS IMPLICITLY ACCEPT THE
FLAWED STATE SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM
A. STATE AND FEDERAL GUN BANS ARE INEFFECTIVE
Recent federal and state actions to disarm batterers are
not saving women’s lives.125 Surprisingly, men appear to be experiencing the greatest benefit from recent domestic violence
policies.126 Since the 1970s, the number of men killed by their
intimate partners decreased substantially while the number of
women murdered in domestic violence incidents did not decline.127 Recent changes that make it easier for women to escape violent relationships, such as the liberal issuance of restraining orders,128 increased recognition of no-fault divorce,129
and the proliferation of battered women’s shelters,130 likely account for the reduction in female-perpetrated homicides against
intimate partners.
Major flaws in federal and state approaches to disarming
batterers cause women to continue to face deadly violence. At
the state level, laws banning gun ownership by batterers are
either non-existent or difficult to enforce. Overall, twenty-six
states currently have no laws ordering batterers to disarm.131
In states that do have such laws, conditions and qualifications
125. See Sorenson, supra note 28, at 231 (“[I]n the past generation, the
phenomenon of intimate partner homicide has changed to be largely the homicide of women.” (emphasis added)).
126. See id. (“An increasing female-to-male ratio of intimate partner homicide is observed for both [b]lacks (0.84 in 1976 to 2.25 in 1999) and [w]hites
(1.72 in 1976 to 3.60 in 1999).”).
127. See id. (“[F]ewer and fewer men were killed by their intimate partners
during the past several decades [1976–2002], but the number of women, particularly [w]hite women, killed changed relatively little. . . . In 1976, there
were 1.17 female victims for every male victim of intimate partner homicide;
in 2002, there were 3.02 female victims for every male victim.”).
128. Clare Dalton & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and the Law
498 (2001).
129. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement:
The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 305, 325 (2006).
130. Archana Nath, Note, Survival or Suffocation: Can Minnesota’s New
Strangulation Law Overcome Implicit Biases in the Justice System?, 25 Law &
Ineq. 253, 262 & n.64 (2007).
131. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 299 (stating the law as of
April 2004).
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reduce the likelihood of disarming batterers. For instance, a
judge might decide that the gun removal provision “is not important” and refuse to impose the ban.132 If the batterer did not
use the gun in the domestic violence incident, he might legally
be able to continue to possess guns or purchase new ones.133 In
many cases, the batterer may only be disarmed for a couple
days,134 and, in states where the abuser must turn in his guns,
he might simply refuse to comply.135
Even if states can legally disarm a batterer, many states
lack the bureaucratic and physical infrastructure to actually
remove the guns. Many states do not have gun repositories
where the guns can be stored.136 Nor do they have the extra law
enforcement officers necessary to confiscate the weapons, catalogue them, store them in the repository and return them once
an order for protection terminates or a misdemeanant’s record
is expunged.137 Some states have no system in place to inform
victims, abusers, employers and police officers of the gun
bans.138 Other states do not have a common database wherein
they may flag the abuser as a “prohibited person.”139 Thus, gun
132. See Thomas B. Cole, Disarming Violent Domestic Abusers Is Key to
Saving Lives, Say Experts, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 557, 557 (2004) (“Some
judges may be reluctant to deal with the gun issue . . . .”); May, supra note 24,
at 22–28 (noting instances wherein local judges did not enforce the gun bans);
Sack, supra note 35, at 21 (“The intersection of domestic violence and firearm
possession . . . appears to be one in which significant confusion or resistance
remains on the part of judges.”).
133. See Cole, supra note 132, at 557 (“[T]he laws may not support taking
the guns away from abusive partners . . . .”); see also Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 306.
134. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 307.
135. See Cole, supra note 132, at 557 (noting that if abusers do not tell the
police or the judge that they have guns, law enforcement officers may not attempt to remove the guns); Sack, supra note 35, at 18 (“After an order to surrender firearms is issued, often little follow-up is done to determine whether
the weapons were actually relinquished.”).
136. See Sack, supra note 35, at 8 (“[T]he federal government provided no
additional resources to the states to help them carry out their role in enforcing
federal law.”).
137. See id.
138. See Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 80 (“[M]any people are unaware of a 1996 federal law that prohibits a person with a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction from possessing . . . a firearm or ammunition . . . .”); Harrison, supra note 98; Matthew A. Radefeld, Ever Heard of the
Lautenberg Amendment? You’re Not Alone, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Nov. 5,
2005, at 3 (noting that many criminal defense attorneys have never heard of
the Lautenberg Amendment).
139. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, DISARMING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ABUSERS:
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dealers and police may not know whether an individual can or
cannot possess or purchase a gun.
While the federal disarmament laws were enacted to ameliorate the inadequacies of the state laws, the federal gun bans
also fail to achieve their goal. The federal bans are severely under enforced, enabling batterers to continue to possess guns.
From 2000 to 2002, 630 suspects were referred to U.S. Attorneys for violations of a firearms-related domestic offense, representing just three percent of the 18,653 federal suspects referred for alleged violent crimes.140 This is a small fraction of
the number of cases that can be prosecuted. Judge Posner of
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit estimates that approximately forty thousand people violate the gun bans each
year by possessing firearms while subject to a protection order.141 A smaller percentage of suspects are convicted.142 The
federal time and money spent on enforcing weapons offenses is
not commensurate to the scope of the problem.
The circumstances that inhibit state and federal authorities from disarming batterers place women in grave danger.
The point at which women seek legal intervention to stop
abuse, either by calling the police or obtaining an order for protection, is often a very risky moment.143 Faced with the possibility of legal sanctions or a loss of power over their partner,
some abusers, like Steven Van Keuren, reassert their control
through deadly force.144 If a batterer is neither disarmed by the
State nor likely to face federal criminal penalties, he will continue to access guns. The laws simply do not impede gun violence against women at the critical point when women most
need the laws’ protection.
The inability of federal and state firearm bans to disarm
STATES SHOULD CLOSE LEGISLATIVE LOOPHOLES THAT ENABLE DOMESTIC
ABUSERS TO PURCHASE AND POSSESS FIREARMS 7–8 (2003), http://
www.bradycampaign.org/pdf/facts/reports/domestic_violence.pdf (noting that
many states do not provide information about domestic misdemeanor convictions to the National Instant Check System or other databases).
140. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS: INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 51 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.
141. Sack, supra note 35, at 8.
142. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 140, at 52 (“Of . . . 52 defendants, 47
(90.4%) were convicted of interstate domestic violence . . . . Of these 47, 37 defendants pleaded guilty (79%), and 10 defendants were convicted at trial
(21%). Five cases were dismissed.”).
143. See May, supra note 24, at 28–29.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21.
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abusers deserves further inquiry. Despite the constitutional validity of the laws and the tremendous need to protect women’s
safety, why are current approaches to gun violence and domestic abuse ineffective? A critical examination of the laws reveals
that continued reliance on the state sovereignty paradigm impedes the ability of the federal government to fully protect
women. Furthermore, ineffective federal action deters progressive state efforts to save women’s lives. As a result, neither the
federal nor state governments properly address gun violence
and domestic abuse. Instead, domestic violence is once again
relegated to a “private” sphere beyond the reach of government
actors. Consequently, women like Teri Lee are left with no alternative but to rely on themselves for protection.145
B. THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM IMPERMISSIBLY FAILS
TO PROTECT WOMEN
An analysis of how federalism doctrine appropriates government responsibility for domestic relations demonstrates
why current approaches to gun violence against women fail.146
The state sovereignty paradigm is not simply a legitimate, neutral idea essential to the operation of federalism. Instead, history shows that legislatures and courts have strategically manipulated the paradigm to accomplish specific political goals.147
Legislatures and courts argue that the federal government has
little power over domestic relations and in so doing, reinforce
women’s social, economic and political subordination.
Historically, the state sovereignty paradigm did not deter
federal action in domestic relations to the extent that it does
today. Instead, history shows that the federal government actively regulated family life during the pre-Civil War era.148 Acting on the belief that a woman’s care-giving activities promoted
the development of a productive citizenry, Congress instituted
programs that supported women and children, including the
creation of widows’ war pensions,149 The legislative record
145. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21.
146. See Adler, supra note 45, at 201 (“Understanding the relationship between federalism and family has the potential to free feminist law reform efforts from the confines of the ideal of the private/state-governed family.”).
147. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1768 (arguing that the state sovereignty
paradigm is a “theory of convenience, strategically invoked and easily dismissed or ignored”).
148. See id. at 1782–1843.
149. See id. at 1782–1803.
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shows that no congressman objected to these federal programs
on the grounds that domestic relations were exclusively a matter of state responsibility.150 Federal courts also resolved domestic issues such as the regulation of married women’s citizenship.151 Federal regulation of domestic relations in the preCivil War era effectively restructured hierarchical male-female
relationships by giving women greater access to economic and
legal resources.152
The use of the state sovereignty paradigm to limit federal
power arose out of the desire to maintain slavery in the
South.153 The possibility of federal involvement in domestic relations constituted an “ominous threat for slave owners.”154 If
the federal government could regulate domestic relations of any
sort, then by implication it could control master-slave relations.155 To oppose federal intervention in slavery, southern
congressmen contested the ability of the federal government to
regulate marriage.156 Hostility towards federal involvement in
the family is evidenced by the debate over the Morrill Act, the
first federal statute to criminalize polygamy.157 Southern congressmen opposed the Act on the understanding that allowing
the federal government to exercise power over a couple’s marital affairs would ultimately lead to federal intervention in the
master-slave relationship.158
While opposition to federal involvement in domestic relations increased, Congress nevertheless intervened to mitigate
violence experienced at the local level. During Reconstruction,
Congress enacted legislation that applied nationwide against
the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist organizations.159 This leg150. See id. at 1785, 1802.
151. See id. at 1815 (noting that in Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242
(1830), a federal court overruled a state supreme court’s determination of a
married woman’s citizenship).
152. See id. at 1767–68.
153. See id. at 1844–45.
154. See id. at 1844.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1844–45; cf. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and
Congress’s Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral
Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 157 (2004) (“[G]iven the history of Congress’s judicially recognized plenary power to enforce the constitutionally secured property rights of slaveholders, Congress had to possess comparable
power to enforce the human rights and equality of all Americans.”).
157. Morrill Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862) (repealed 1910).
158. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1845.
159. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 152.
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islation aimed to stop white supremacist groups from subjecting African Americans to physical and sexual violence.160 As
this federal legislation demonstrates, the state sovereignty
paradigm did not stop previous Congresses from acting to prevent local violence.
The preservation of the gendered public and private
spheres evolved to become the explicit goal of advocates of the
state sovereignty paradigm during the early twentieth century.161 At this time, opponents of women’s suffrage asserted
that a federal amendment allowing women to vote would corrupt the family.162 Opponents argued that enfranchising
women would introduce “‘the bedlam of political debate’ into
the home,”163 distract women from their household duties,164
and “threaten[] the unity of the marriage relation.”165 Paradoxically, at the same time that legislators opposed federal intervention in the family, they also demanded federal solutions
to nationwide marital “problems.”166 Alarmed by the frequency
of divorce and a perceived increase in interracial marriage, legislators argued that the federal government should regulate
domestic relations.167 At the core of each of these contentious
issues—women’s suffrage, divorce, and interracial marriage—
was women’s “traditional” role in the family.168 Advocates invoked either the primacy of state sovereignty or the necessity of
federal power to preserve the family’s gender hierarchy.169
The historically contingent arguments for and against federal regulation of domestic relations teach an important lesson
about the operation of the state sovereignty paradigm. Traditionally, the state sovereignty paradigm has acted as a rhetori160. See id. at 155 (“[Ku Klux] Klan violence during Reconstruction, like
much gender-based violence today, was often highly sexualized, including
eroticized whipping, oral rape, genital mutilation, and other forms of sexual
torture.”).
161. See Adler, supra note 45, at 199 (“[I]nvestment in state rather than
federal control over family is incidental to our legal culture’s larger investment
in preserving family’s place in the private sphere.”).
162. See Collins, supra note 43, at 1851–53.
163. Id. at 1852 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 48-1330, at 3 (1884)).
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 993
(2002)).
166. See id. at 1851.
167. Id. at 1853–56.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 1856.
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cal device to advance specific social agendas concerning women.
The use of the paradigm continues today to women’s detriment,
as illustrated by a comparison of United States v. Morrison170
and Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.171 In
Morrison, the Supreme Court prevented victims of domestic
violence from suing their abusers in federal court.172 Hibbs, on
the other hand, declared that the states are not immune from
legal liability when they deny state employees unpaid leave to
care for family members with a “serious health condition.”173
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “the States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based
discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is
weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [federal] legislation.”174 In contrast to Morrison, the Supreme Court
in Hibbs allowed federal intervention in domestic relations by
validating the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
While the different outcomes in Morrison and Hibbs may
be reconciled, they nevertheless reveal how the state sovereignty paradigm continues to subordinate women.175 The
Court’s decision in Hibbs rested on the idea that Congress
could permissibly regulate the “public” arena of the workplace,
whereas in Morrison, privacy concerns preempted federal intervention in the home.176 However, distinguishing these cases
in this regard relies on a shallow analysis of Hibbs. Ultimately,
the Hibbs decision expressly permitted the federal government
to “fix” the gender hierarchy of the household.177 Through federal legislation that allowed both men and women to take time
off work for care-taking responsibilities, Hibbs attempted to
correct state policies that assumed women alone were responsible for care-giving.178 Morrison could have also ameliorated
gender hierarchy in the home by providing federal redress for
170. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
171. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
172. 529 U.S. at 627.
173. 538 U.S. at 724–25.
174. Id. at 735.
175. Collins, supra note 43, at 1768.
176. See id. at 1774 (“[The] FMLA is more easily seen as a labor regulation
and, as such, is more readily understood as addressing a ‘federal’ issue.”).
177. See id. at 1773 (“[W]hen [the] FMLA was challenged on federalism
grounds before the Supreme Court, much attention was given to the fact that
[the] FMLA was intended to foster gender equality in the allocation of caregiving responsibilities within families.”).
178. Id.
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the violence that impedes gender equality. While privacy concerns were prevalent in Morrison, the Court did not display
similar concerns in Hibbs,179 despite the fact that the federal
regulation in Hibbs did not impact the workplace so much as it
attempted to achieve gender equality within the home.180
The inconsistent application of the state sovereignty paradigm in Morrison and Hibbs lends credibility to the suggestion
that federal judges “tend to ‘selectively invoke[]’ federalism
rules ‘only when ideologically convenient.’”181 While the gender
discrimination at issue in Hibbs was cognizable as a federal
matter, the gender discrimination targeted by VAWA was
not.182 Arguably, this “pick and choose” approach is “motivated
largely (or entirely) by a hostility to women’s rights.”183 Undoubtedly, women have gained a larger presence in the workplace since the 1960s.184 Perhaps the growing acceptance of
women’s right to work has made federal laws that make it easier for women to work more permissible. In contrast, women’s
right to be free from violence remains socially tenuous, as demonstrated by the fact that many states, as well as the federal
government, have only recently acted to try to stop violence
against women.185 While courts and legislators accept that the
federal government may actively seek new roles for women in
the workplace, the propriety of federal action designed to undermine what some deem a fundamental source of women’s
inequality—physical and sexual violence by men—remains controversial.186
179. See id. at 1762–63.
180. See id. at 1773.
181. See id. at 1771 (alteration in original) (quoting Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1306 (1999)).
182. See id. at 1774.
183. Saylor, supra note 119, at 141.
184. Eduardo Porter, Stretched to Limit, Women Stall March to Work, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at C2.
185. See Rousseve, supra note 92, at 440 (“[I]t was not until the 1970s and
1980s that the criminal justice system abandoned its policy of nonintervention and began to treat domestic violence as a public crime.”); Herbert,
supra note 22 (“[W]e have become so accustomed to living in a society saturated with misogyny that violence against females is more or less to be expected.”).
186. Feminist scholars argue that the Morrison decision demonstrates the
legal system’s reluctance to punish domestic violence. See MacKinnon, supra
note 50, at 171 (“[Morrison’s decision that] systematic state nonintervention in
the private is not a state act, is a public decision by the highest Court of the
nation to support male power, i.e. sex inequality, in the most violent sphere in
which it is socially exercised.”).
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C. ADMINISTERING THE FEDERAL GUN BANS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM DOES NOT DETER
GUN VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Federal gun bans reinforce the state sovereignty paradigm
by operating as “federal supplemental sanctions.”187 To be implemented, the laws rely on state courts to determine whether
a person is “subject to an order for protection” or has been “convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor” under state law.188
However, the ways in which the bans are actually implemented
remain unclear. Federal laws do not specify who must notify
the victim and defendant of the gun bans, determine whether
the defendant is armed, remove and store the gun, or inform
the victim in cases when the defendant is rearmed.189 The absence of these vital terms ensures that the federal laws must
rely on the states’ method of disarming batterers.190 The lack of
a meaningful federal process to disarm batterers presupposes
that the states should regulate domestic relations. What the
laws overlook is that many states have no mechanisms to remove guns and others do so erratically.
By implicitly accepting the flawed state sovereignty paradigm, the federal gun bans fail to deter violence against
women. Three major problems result from this administration
of federal law. First, states have few incentives to enforce the
federal gun bans and the federal government does not do so itself. Second, the lack of transparency in regard to which the
government entity is responsible for carrying out the federal
gun bans means that neither the state nor federal governments
are accountable for achieving the laws’ mandate. This lack of
clarity creates indeterminacy and unpredictability in the law

187. See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1416 (2005) (defining federal supplemental sanctions
as “the consequences that follow by operation of federal law” after “a state official determines that a state law is violated”).
188. See id. at 1416–18.
189. See Golden, supra note 123, at 456 (“The lack of clarity as to whether
federal or state law prevails in the Lautenberg Amendment context could
cause courts to apply the Lautenberg Amendment differently and arbitrarily.”); Mikos, supra note 187, at 1419 (“The federal government makes no effort to even inform the convict of the sanction, and compliance with the sanction is entirely the responsibility of the party subject to it.”); id. at 1414 (“In
essence, Congress free rides on the efforts of state law enforcement agencies.”).
190. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 2 (“[T]he federal laws cannot
be fully enforced, and will not be completely effective in disarming abusers,
without complementary and implementing legislation from the states.”).
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and consequently results in a third problem. State judges, not
federal or state legislators, ultimately make the decisions that
give substantive meaning to the federal firearm bans.
1. States Have Few Incentives to Implement the Federal Gun
Bans
There is no provision in the federal gun bans that provides
economic incentives to states to enforce the federal laws.191
Without monetary support, many states may not carry out the
laws. States that currently have no laws to disarm batterers
are unlikely to use state resources to enforce a federal law that
is not even a priority for—and may in fact be opposed by—
their constituents. States that already disarm batterers in
some capacity will not be compelled to divert their resources to
enforce the federal bans, as these states will likely prefer to devote time and money to enforcing their own gun bans. However,
many of the states’ gun bans use poor or ineffective mechanisms to remove the guns. Although the federal gun bans may
help some women pursue federal prosecution of their armed
batterers when a state remedy is not available, providing a
remedy after-the-fact is not the same as preventing batterers
from becoming armed, the laws’ original purpose.192 When the
federal government neither devotes its own police power to enforcing the gun laws nor effectively persuades the states to do
so, the gun laws cannot achieve their goal.
The federal government’s failure to establish an effective
means of disarming batterers has several negative effects.
Since federal legislators purportedly represent national norms
and moral standards, their inability to develop a realistic
method of disarming batterers signals that they do not consider
gun violence against women a national problem worthy of a national solution.193 Consequently, violence against women is not
legitimized as a serious crime worthy of punishment.194
191. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West 2000 & Supp.
2006).
192. See May, supra note 24, at 6 (“[The federal gun bans] are preventative
measures; they target deadly abuse before it happens. By requiring abusers to
relinquish their firearms as soon as courts find them to be abusive, the laws
protect domestic abuse victims from gun violence before guns have been implicated in the abuse pattern.”).
193. See Adler, supra note 45, at 203 (“[F]ederal reluctance to address family litigation betrays a gendered stratification of legal issues in which federal
. . . attention is reserved for matters of national significance.”).
194. See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic Violence,
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Additionally, Congress undermines the unique, national
representative capacity of federal law.195 Since the federal laws
do not delineate how batterers must be disarmed, both identifying batterers and removing their guns ultimately depends on
state policies that are never formally approved by Congress.196
The results is a political process problem. Rather than reflecting collective national interests, the federal gun bans acquiesce
to local priorities on guns and domestic violence.197 These localities—defined by their own values and worldviews—are not
accountable to the interests of the nation as a whole. In the
worst case scenario, the misogynist views of one jurisdiction
may assume federal status by standing in for federal law.198
Lastly, by relying on state policies, Congress deprives
women of a fundamental component of the constitutional design. Namely, it disables women from accessing an important
“laboratory”—the federal government itself.199 Ultimately, Congress denies women the opportunity to benefit from a solution
that only the federal government can provide: a national, carefully crafted approach that adopts effective state laws while
discarding those that have proven to be ineffective.
2. The Federal Gun Bans Abate State Responsibility for
Domestic Violence
While reliance on the state sovereignty paradigm incapacitates the federal gun bans, the federal laws themselves also
impair the states from deterring gun violence and domestic
abuse. This dilution of government power occurs because the
federal gun bans weaken the ability of the states to prosecute

106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1543 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses] (“[Nonenforcement of the federal firearm bans] communicate[s] a message that domestic violence is not as serious as assault between strangers . . . .”).
195. See Logan, supra note 80, at 87.
196. See id. (arguing that the political economies of the states are unavoidably incorporated into state law).
197. See id. at 67 (“[The United States] actually uses state laws and outcomes, and in doing so infuses federal law with the normative judgments of
the respective states.”).
198. See id. at 89 (“[B]y deferring to state laws and outcomes the [United
States] allocates to states the power to define the content and application of
federal law.”); Mikos, supra note 187, at 1431 (“State laws differ, and those
differences will carry over to congressional statutes that refer to them.”).
199. See Logan, supra note 80, at 84 (“As a result of federal deference,
there is one less ‘lab’ (the U.S. government) that can be used to address perceived anti-social behavior.”).
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domestic violence crimes.200 Since a defendant faces the possibility of federal sanctions (and possibly state sanctions as well),
suspected abusers have a compelling reason to refuse a guilty
plea to a crime of domestic violence and to contest the issuance
of an order for protection.201
State prosecutors thus face a dilemma—whether to take
the case to trial or to offer the defendant a plea bargain.202 Trials are costly both in terms of money and time. In addition,
domestic violence cases are often “he said, she said” situations
and many victims recant or refuse to cooperate, making the
cases difficult to prove.203 Furthermore, the stiff penalties that
the court may be impose on the defendant strengthens the likelihood that he will vigorously defend himself.204 Due to these
inherent limitations, many prosecutors will hesitate to expend
their scarce resources on a trial.205
Alternatively, prosecutors may opt to modify the criminal
charges through plea deals.206 For instance, to settle the case
and avoid trial, a prosecutor might change the misdemeanor
domestic violence charge to a misdemeanor conviction for “disorderly conduct.”207 This action guarantees the prosecutor a
conviction while avoiding the expense of a trial. However, such
a scenario allows prosecutors and defendants to avoid the gun
bans entirely. Removing the domestic violence misdemeanor
conviction—and the corresponding ban on firearms—from the
200. See Mikos, supra note 187, at 1415 (“[A] state may try to skirt the federal sanctions . . . to minimize the costs of enforcing its own laws or to thwart
federal policies with which the state or its agents disagree.”).
201. See id. at 1457 (demonstrating that while the significance of the firearms ban depends on the value the abuser attaches to the privilege of possessing a firearm, it is “particularly severe” for anyone who must handle a firearm
on the job since they will lose their job once the ban is triggered).
202. See id. at 1420.
203. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 22 (noting that many women
never speak of domestic abuse).
204. See Mikos, supra note 187, at 1459–60 (“Many convicted domestic
abusers have sought to withdraw their guilty pleas, claiming they would have
opted for trial had they known about the firearms ban. . . . Further, defense
attorneys have noted a rise in trial rates for domestic violence cases since the
Lautenberg Amendment was enacted.”).
205. See id. at 1462 (noting that since prosecutors may not consider domestic violence cases to be a high priority, they are unlikely to divert resources
from other cases to bring domestic violence cases to trial).
206. See id. at 1420.
207. See id. at 1460 (arguing that a defendant will be more likely to plead
to disorderly conduct than to assault and battery so as to avoid the firearms
ban).
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table allows the prosecutor to get an easier conviction while the
defendant gets to keep his guns.208
In addition to undermining federal law, plea bargaining
also obstructs state law. Instead of using state statutes to punish domestic violence, the prosecutor may forego domestic violence convictions in favor of lesser charges.209 Consequently,
the prosecutor does not rely upon either the federal or state
gun bans. As a result, plea bargaining circumvents both state
and federal laws designed to help battered women.
Federal and state actors are further discouraged from carrying out the firearm bans because neither entity is held accountable for protecting women against gun violence. The firearm bans set up a blame game scenario wherein legislators,
police officers, and state and federal attorneys avoid political
consequences. On the one hand, state actors can easily attribute the failure of the firearm bans to federal authorities. After
all, it is the U.S. Attorneys’ offices that must prosecute and
sentence individuals who violate the federal gun bans.210 The
states’ integral role in identifying which persons are prohibited
from owning guns and removing their guns is hidden from the
average constituent, who may be unfamiliar with how the federal gun bans are implemented.
On the other hand, federal legislators can also blame the
failure of the firearms bans on state governments. By simply
reiterating the state sovereignty paradigm, members of Congress can argue that federal action is necessarily limited, since
the “private sphere” is ultimately within the domain of the
State.211 According to this perspective, if state legislators and
judges choose not to step into conflicts between intimate partners or to send police officers to disarm abusers in their homes,
there is little that Congress can do.
When neither the state nor federal governments take responsibility for effectively implementing the firearm bans,
women must resort to their own devices to protect themselves
208. See id. at 1461 (“State prosecutors have acknowledged that they reduce state charges to help some defendants avoid Lautenberg consequences.”).
209. See id. (“Avoiding a conviction not only undermines the congressional
aims behind the firearms ban, it may dilute the state sanctions as well. . . .
[D]efendants . . . may not be punished at all for their actions—by either the
[S]tate or Congress.”).
210. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 140, at 51–52.
211. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 171–72 (arguing that the federal
government designates domestic violence as a “private” problem that does not
require federal intervention).
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and their families.212 Unfortunately, as in the case of Teri Lee,
even when women take steps to safeguard their own lives, their
abusers often prevail.213 In dire situations, an abused woman
may have no alternative but to use a gun against her partner to
end his destructive control.214 The failure of state and federal
authorities to disarm batterers is therefore likely to result in
the continued abuse—and murder—of women.
3. The Federal Gun Bans Allow Excessive Judicial Discretion
The administration of the federal gun bans problematically
allows for judicial discretion. When there is no state law to
guide how the federal firearm bans are to be effectuated, state
judges inevitably must fill in the gaps. Since the states already
approach domestic violence in vastly distinct ways,215 judges
will likely interpret the federal gun bans very differently. The
absence of a concrete standard results in unfairness both to victims and to defendants.216 Some defendants are disarmed while
other similarly situated defendants are not. Likewise, some victims are protected while other similarly situated victims are
not. These unpredictable outcomes undercut the ability of the
states and the federal government to administer gun removal
programs that the public will view as a legitimate, just exercise
of government power.217
In cases of domestic violence, it is questionable whether judicial discretion achieves fairness. Historically, judges have
doubted the credibility of domestic abuse victims.218 Judges,
212. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 6–10, 17–21.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21.
214. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL
AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 30 (1989) (“When a battered woman kills her
abuser, she has reached the end of the line. She is absolutely desperate, in real
despair. She believes, with good reason, that if she does not kill, she will be
killed.”).
215. See Mikos, supra note 187, at 1430 (“Under our federal system, states
have wide latitude to define crimes and their consequences to suit local tastes .
. . . It should thus come as no surprise that the criminal law differs substantively from state to state.”).
216. See id. at 1428 (“Justice demands treating like cases alike. . . . The
fairness of federal sanctions is called into doubt when they are triggered by
some, but not all, similar cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
217. See id. at 1430–31.
218. See May, supra note 24, at 25–26 (“[L]ittle has changed over the years
in judicial attitudes toward victims of domestic violence. . . . Some judges discount the credibility of women because they view women as unreasonable and
overly emotional.”).
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like the public, often believe the victim deserved the abuse or
was irresponsible because she “should have left.”219 Unfortunately, the risk that such stereotypes will improperly influence
a judge’s decision remains real.220
Judicial discretion in the context of domestic violence poses
further challenges since it easily eludes review.221 Misdemeanor domestic violence cases and order for protection hearings tend to be low-profile matters with little money at stake.222
At order for protection hearings, victims are usually not represented by counsel.223 Victims rarely appeal adverse decisions
and the records created at trial are often unrevealing and difficult to access.224 Without the safeguarding effects of adversarial
representation and appellate review, judges may apply the laws
subjectively.
By relying on the state sovereignty paradigm, the federal
gun bans place women and their families in a dangerous situation. Nationally, the federal government purports to be taking
unprecedented steps to stop gun violence against women.225 Locally, however, Congress abdicates its authority to the states,
allowing home-grown values regarding women’s roles, male violence, and gun ownership to determine the effectiveness of federal law. In the majority of states without laws mandating firearm removal, women are at risk. In the states where an abused
woman’s case satisfies the statutory requirements to remove
the gun—and state authorities actually confiscate and retain
the gun—some women may benefit. Congress will then applaud
women’s successes as evidence of the statutes’ effectiveness,
219. See id. at 28 (“Common misperceptions, like the belief that victims
could leave the relationships if they wanted to and the resulting frustration
with them for not leaving, lead to inherent biases against victims.”); Anne C.
Johnson, Note, From House to Home: Creating a Right to Early Lease Termination for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1862 (2006)
(“Some people . . . including . . . judges . . . believe that victims ‘provoke’ their
abusers, thereby holding victims responsible for their abuse.”).
220. See May, supra note 24, at 25 (arguing that local judges continue to
disregard domestic violence laws due to “ingrained biases against battered
women”).
221. See id. at 10.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Domestic Violence Prevention,
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1341, 1342 (Oct. 8, 2003) (“The fight against
domestic violence is a national movement. . . . Our government is engaged in
the fight . . . .”).
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while disregarding women’s losses as a matter of state concern.
However, what Congress ignores is that a single adverse ruling
for a battered woman like Teri Lee could prove fatal.226
III. RETHINKING THE FEDERAL GUN BANS
Ultimately, battered women do not have the luxury of concerning themselves with the proper exercise of federal and
state power.227 What women want is quick and effective protection for themselves and their families.228 To realize this goal,
Congress should take three immediate steps. First, Congress
should provide funding for states to adopt the federal gun bans
to serve as a minimum requirement for disarming batterers.
Second, Congress should facilitate the states’ ability to remove
guns by providing monetary incentives for the creation of local
gun units. Lastly, Congress should require states to report information regarding individuals prohibited from possessing
firearms to federal authorities so that Congress may strategically disseminate grants to the areas of the country most in
need.
A. USING CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER TO ENCOURAGE STATE
ACTION
Supreme Court precedent limits Congress’s ability to induce state legislatures or executives to enforce federal law. In
New York v. United States, the Supreme Court established an
“anti-commandeering” principle, stating that Congress cannot
compel state legislatures to adopt federal law as state law.229 In
addition, the Court held in Printz v. United States that Congress cannot coerce a state’s executive branch to enforce federal
law.230 At issue in Printz was the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1993.231 This federal law directed state law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on individuals and to provide the information to firearm dealers.232 The
Court found that the Act unconstitutionally superseded state
sovereignty by converting state police forces into an arm of the

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See supra text accompanying notes 1–21.
See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 176.
See id.
505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992).
521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997).
Id. at 902.
Id. at 904.
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federal government.233 Under New York and Printz, Congress
can neither command state legislatures to adopt the federal
gun bans as state statutes, nor amend the federal gun bans to
require state authorities to execute the laws.
However, Congress still retains several important means of
influencing the states. Foremost among these is Congress’s
ability to encourage state action through exercise of its spending power.234 In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that Congress may attach conditions to federal funds.235 In Dole, the
Court found constitutional a federal law that withheld federal
highway funds from any state that allowed persons under the
age of twenty-one to purchase or possess alcohol.236 At the time,
a South Dakota law permitted nineteen-year-olds to buy
beer.237 Under Dole, South Dakota was forced to set its age
limit at twenty-one years, as required by federal law, or forego
federal funds.238 The Court thus acknowledged that Congress
can constitutionally achieve objectives not outlined in its enumerated powers through the conditional grant of federal
funds.239
1. Congress Should Provide Funds to States to Induce
Adoption of the Federal Gun Bans
In accordance with Dole, Congress should use its spending
power to entice state legislatures to adopt the federal gun bans
as state law.240 An amendment to VAWA would make federal
funds available to the states for several purposes. Money could
be appropriated to train local judges to disarm batterers, to
provide additional resources for state prosecutors and victim
advocates, and to promote cooperation between state and federal authorities during the process of identifying, disarming,
and prosecuting batterers who possess guns. As a condition for
receipt of these funds, Congress should stipulate that state leg233. Id. at 935.
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
235. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
236. Id. at 212.
237. Id. at 205.
238. Id. at 210.
239. Id. at 207.
240. See Sack, supra note 35, at 10 (“Although domestic violence offenders
are already subject to the federal law, state legislation makes it straightforward that the state courts must implement the law and thereby prevents resistant judges from failing to enforce firearms laws in domestic violence
cases.”).
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islatures must adopt the federal gun bans as a minimum requirement for disarming batterers. Since Congress already uses
VAWA to distribute money to the states to create resources for
battered women, VAWA would also be an effective vehicle for
imposing this condition and disseminating the proposed
grants.241
The federal law adopted by the states should first be
amended to clearly outline the disarmament process. The law
should require that, upon issuing an order for protection or a
domestic violence misdemeanor conviction, the judge must ask
both parties whether the defendant currently owns or possesses
a gun.242 The judge should then explain that the defendant can
no longer possess or purchase a gun under state law.243 The
judge should issue a standardized form outlining the gun prohibition and specifying the types of guns in the defendant’s possession.244 The gun prohibition should be unambiguously included in both civil and criminal no-contact orders.245
Most importantly, the order should state that the respondent must turn in his guns to a local gun repository, as specified by the court, within forty-eight hours.246 Alternatively, if
241. Cf. id. at 22 (arguing that the current lack of guidelines regarding the
enforcement of the federal firearm bans resembles the confusion that resulted
upon VAWA’s requirement that each jurisdiction give full faith and credit to
domestic violence protection orders, and noting that Congress allocated funds
to train state law enforcement officials to standardize implementation of the
full faith and credit provision).
242. See Cole, supra note 132, at 557 (stating that judges need to ask
whether the defendant owns guns); cf. Sack, supra note 35, at 18–19 (noting
that the protocol in Miami-Dade County, Florida requires a judge to make an
“on-record” inquiry of each respondent to verify the current status of weapons).
243. See Frattaroli & Vernick, supra note 93, at 308 (showing that North
Carolina and California already have similar policies).
244. See Sack, supra note 35, at 18 (stating that for full faith and credit
purposes, clearly outlining the gun prohibition will alert law enforcement officers in other states that the order implicates the firearm bans); cf. BRADY
CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 6 (demonstrating that six states and the District
of Columbia have already taken steps toward issuing uniform orders for protection through their participation in a program called Project Passport, which
requires that all restraining orders have a similar first page).
245. Generally, the Act has been interpreted to apply to orders for protection issued in civil courts. To target batterers more accurately, the firearm
bans must also apply to no-contact orders issued in criminal courts. See BRADY
CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 5. By applying the statute to both civil and
criminal no-contact orders, the Act would cast a wider net.
246. Cf. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(c) (West 2004) (requiring that a respondent
relinquish any firearms possessed within twenty-four hours, either by turning
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the defendant is on probation, the court might order him to give
up his guns to his probation officer, who would then be responsible for depositing the guns.247 The order should state that if
the respondent fails to turn in his weapons within the specified
time period, a warrant will be issued for his arrest.248 The warrant shall authorize police officers to search his residence and
seize the guns.249 During the time when the defendant remains
armed, the judge should take proactive steps to ensure the victim’s safety. For instance, the judge could ensure that the victim meets with a court-appointed “victim advocate” who could
develop a safety plan with her, refer her to domestic abuse shelters, or help her change the locks at her residence.
The effect of the grant program would be particularly profound in the twenty-six states that currently have no laws to
disarm batterers. Access to federal funds would entice such
states to adopt the laws since states would not be independently responsible for paying for the program. Some states might
remain politically opposed to taking guns away from individuals. Still, the grant program would likely help proponents of
disarmament win greater support by creating a viable system
for gun confiscation that state legislatures and lobbying groups
could consider.
States that already have laws allowing judges and police to
disarm batterers could also benefit from the federal grants.
them in to local law enforcement or by selling them to a licensed dealer); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 842-a5(a) (McKinney Supp. 2006) (“[T]he . . . order of protection shall specify the place where such firearms shall be surrendered, shall
specify a date and time by which the surrender shall be completed and, to the
extent possible, shall describe such firearms to be surrendered and shall direct
the authority receiving such surrendered firearms to immediately notify the
court of such surrender.”).
247. See Sack, supra note 35, at 20 (noting that probation officers in Seattle are directly involved with confiscating weapons from respondents and that
probation units routinely screen defendants to check for existing protection
orders and to ask about firearms).
248. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f ) (1998) (permitting a police officer to apply for a search warrant for the limited purpose of seizing a firearm or ammunition); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (Supp. 2006) (authorizing the court to
issue a search warrant for a peace officer to seize any and all firearms).
249. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28j (West 2005) (authorizing an ex parte
order to “forbid[ ] the defendant from possessing any firearm or other weapon
. . . [or] order[ ] the search for and seizure of any such weapon at any location
where the judge has reasonable cause to believe the weapon is located”); id.
§ 2C:25-29b(16) (ordering the search for and seizure of any prohibited firearm
at any location where the judge has reasonable cause to believe the weapon is
located).
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Since a state’s adoption of the federal laws is the minimum required to receive the federal grants, doing so would not displace
state laws that disarm batterers more aggressively. The federal
legislation adopted by the states should provide that the federal
gun bans supersede any prior state legislation or policy that
conflicts with their operation. However, adoption of the federal
laws would not curtail the states’ ability to enact more progressive solutions to domestic violence. By using grants to encourage all states to ensure women a minimum level of protection
from gun violence, Congress would take steps toward establishing a uniform approach to disarming batterers nationwide.
States that agreed to adopt Congress’s minimum standards
would benefit from the extra funds they would receive to enforce the laws.
States that accept the federal grant and its conditions will
better deter batterers from possessing guns.250 Batterers will
face a greater likelihood of being penalized if they fail to follow
the law, since they can be prosecuted under either state or federal law, or both.251 In addition, batterers would be more
quickly and effectively disarmed. The same state judge who
presides over the defendant’s domestic violence misdemeanor
case or issues the order for protection must require the defendant to give up his guns. State judges are therefore required to
take immediate steps to remove the guns while the defendants
are in their courtrooms.
2. Congress Should Provide Funds to Establish Local Gun
Units
Congress should also provide funds through VAWA for the
formation of locally operated gun units that would serve to disarm batterers.252 Any state that receives this grant would be
250. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 7 (noting that after Illinois
enacted a law prohibiting violent misdemeanants from purchasing a firearm
in 1996, more than 28,000 Illinois domestic violence misdemeanants were
added to databases that prohibited them from purchasing firearms).
251. See Logan, supra note 80, at 68 (“Double prosecution [by the federal
and state governments] is permissible . . . because the respective governments
are ‘two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory.’” (quoting United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922))); Sack, supra note 35, at 10 (noting
that the differing state and federal laws do not pose a Supremacy Clause issue
since the laws are “‘parallel restrictions,’ both of which remain applicable”).
252. Richmond, Virginia’s Project Exile may be a model for the development of locally operated gun units. See Sack, supra note 35, at 20–21 (explaining that police officers in Richmond who participate in this program receive
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required to establish gun units at an appropriate jurisdictional
level.253 The grant would further require that each gun unit be
staffed by law enforcement officials, investigators, prosecutors,
and administrative personnel. Teams within the units would be
responsible for the operation of a gun repository as well as for
investigation and enforcement of the gun bans.
Using federal funds to create locally operated gun repositories would establish secure sites where individuals could relinquish their guns.254 Upon receipt of a firearm, state employees
would catalogue the deposit and safely store the gun. The repository would issue a formal receipt to the defendant confirming that he had turned in his gun. A copy of the receipt would
be sent to the judge who issued the court order as well as to the
victim.255 If the prohibited individual becomes eligible to retrieve his firearm—either because the order for protection expires or because his record is expunged—the gun repository
employees would make reasonable efforts to notify the victim
that the individual is once again armed.256
In addition to operating the repository, the gun units
would be equipped to handle situations where a batterer either
refuses to turn over his guns or purchases new firearms. The
unit’s law enforcement officers would be automatically updated
if the prohibited individual does not comply with the court’s order to turn in his gun. The officers would then undertake all
necessary steps to find the individual and his firearms in order
to arrest and disarm him. Furthermore, investigators would
routinely compare databases that confirm information about
prohibited individuals with those identifying gun purchases
and licenses. Investigators could flag batterers who purchase
guns after the court has issued an order for protection or misdemeanor conviction. The gun unit’s police officers would then

special training to enforce state and federal firearm bans).
253. States should create the gun units at the most appropriate level of
their jurisdiction. For instance, the gun units could be created at the state,
county, or city level.
254. Cf. WIS. STAT. § 813.12(4m) (2006) (permitting storage of a firearm in
a public warehouse).
255. Cf. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(c) (West 2004) (ordering respondents to file
a receipt with the court that proves that any firearms were either relinquished
to the police or sold within seventy-two hours of the issuance of the court order).
256. See generally Sack, supra note 35, at 19 (summarizing the court procedure defendants in one jurisdiction must undertake to obtain their confiscated guns).
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obtain a warrant to apprehend and disarm the person.
Beyond these services, state personnel would monitor compliance with the gun bans. State employees would review
whether police officers promptly and effectively disarm batterers. The gun unit would also administer volunteer-based “citizen watchdog groups.”257 Trained participants would attend
court hearings to observe whether judges abide by the gun bans
when arraigning domestic violence misdemeanants and issuing
orders for protection. Volunteers would compile their observations in a published report. Sharing such information would increase the accountability of judges who fail to effectuate the
gun bans, because battered women’s advocacy groups and media outlets could subject such them to public recrimination. The
reports could be submitted to the chief judicial officer to inquire
into the judges’ practices, thus stimulating greater judicial
oversight.
Recent federal laws serve as models for how Congress
could craft legislation to provide incentives for the states to
create gun units. Both the Hate Crimes Prevention Program258
and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program259 distribute federal funds to states and organizations for
the purpose of combating specific crimes.260 Congress could
draw on the statutory language of both programs to amend
VAWA to include grants for combating gun violence against
women. For instance, the Hate Crimes Prevention statute authorizes the Department of Justice (DOJ) to make grants to local organizations “for the purpose of providing assistance to localities most directly affected by hate crimes.”261 Similarly, an
amendment to VAWA should authorize the DOJ to distribute
money to states to instruct police officers, prosecutors, and
judges how to investigate, disarm, and prosecute batterers who
possess guns.
257. Such volunteer-based groups could be modeled after WATCH, a community organization in Minneapolis that trains volunteers to monitor and report on the criminal justice system to ensure the fair treatment of domestic
violence victims. See WATCH, http://www.watchmn.org (last visited Feb. 12,
2007).
258. 20 U.S.C. § 7133(a) (Supp. IV 2001–2006).
259. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3796dd to 3796dd-8 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
260. See 20 U.S.C. § 7133(a) (providing federal funds to local organizations
to combat hate crimes); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796dd(a) (authorizing grants to states
and other entities to improve cooperation between law enforcement and the
community).
261. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7133(a).
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Also, just as Congress suggested in the COPS Program
that federal funds be used for “innovative programs to increase
and enhance proactive crime control and prevention programs
involving law enforcement officers and young people,”262 the
VAWA amendment would state that the grant be used to establish gun units to proactively remove and retain guns. To accomplish this task, the VAWA grant would, like the COPS program, provide funds “to hire additional community policing
officers and civilian personnel to investigate” persons who must
be disarmed.
3. Conditioning Federal Funds to Accomplish These Goals
Satisfies the Dole Test
A program that provides grants to states that adopt the
federal gun bans and create gun units is constitutional under
Dole. In Dole, Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated a five-part
test to determine the constitutionality of Congress’s use of its
spending power.263 This test requires that (1) the exercise of the
spending power is in the pursuit of the “general welfare”; (2)
Congress clearly states the conditions imposed on the funds; (3)
a germane connection exists between the funds and the federal
interest in the particular national program; (4) no independent
constitutional bar impedes the distribution of federal funds;
and (5) federal authorities do not coercively garner the states’
compliance.264
According to Dole, the courts should “defer substantially to
the judgment of Congress” in determining whether federal
funding satisfies the “general welfare” requirement.265 Given
this undemanding standard of review, Congress could easily
argue that disarming batterers promotes the public good. Removing guns helps to save the lives of intimate partners and
keeps family and innocent bystanders safe. The grants would
also deter costs which would otherwise tax the public purse,
such as victims’ use of emergency health care services.266 The
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

42 U.S.C.A. § 3796dd(b)(12).
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 207.
See PAULA WEBER, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, A REPORT OF THE
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
PREVENTION 3–4 (2005) (reporting that the health-related costs of intimatepartner violence exceed $5.8 billion per year in the United States, of which
nearly $4.1 billion are direct medical and mental health care services and $1.8
billion are productivity losses).
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program would enhance judicial efficiency because women
would not need to go to court frequently to ensure that state
authorities take away their abusers’ guns. Reducing the number of armed batterers may also reduce the number of domestic
calls to which police officers respond because fewer women
would be threatened with guns. This sampling of the numerous
public benefits of federal grants shows that Congress would
likely satisfy the “general welfare” requirement.
The federal grants would also fulfill the second requirement of a “clear statement.” Congress would simply need to
state unambiguously that the distribution of the grants is conditioned on states’ fulfillment of the specified requirements.267
Because Congress has successfully outlined the conditions of its
grants before, as in the Hate Crimes Prevention Program and
the COPS Program,268 Congress should also be able to provide a
clear statement in the case at hand.
A “germane” connection between the funds and the federal
program could also be proved. The Hate Crimes Prevention
Program links funding for training and education improvements to the goal of deterring hate crimes,269 and the COPS
Program links funds for increased police presence to the goal of
improving police/community relations.270 Similarly, Congress
could link the proposed grant program to the federal goal of
protecting women from gun violence. Because courts use the rational basis standard to review the existence of a “germane
connection,”271 Congress would likely pass this requirement.
It is unlikely that an independent constitutional bar would
prohibit the use of federal funds to compel the states to enact
the gun bans and establish gun units. Opponents might claim a
violation of the Second and Tenth Amendments. However,
courts have already stated that the federal gun bans do not violate the Second Amendment.272 In addition, Dole clearly noted
that the Tenth Amendment does not limit the use of conditional
267. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
268. See 20 U.S.C. § 7133 (Supp. IV 2001–2006); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3796dd to
3796dd-8 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
269. 20 U.S.C. § 7133.
270. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796dd(a).
271. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (“[It is sufficient that] Congress conditioned
the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address th[e]
particular impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended.” (emphasis added)).
272. See United States v. Jackubowski, 63 F. App’x 959, 961 (7th Cir.
2003); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 224–25 (5th Cir. 2001).
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federal funds.273 Dole also cautioned that the grants must not
incite invidious discrimination or cruel and unusual punishment.274 However, the proposed grant program is unlikely to
create such problems because the gun bans apply to everyone
and gun owners may retrieve their guns once their order for
protection terminates or their record is expunged.275 Furthermore, Congress could avoid coercing the states to change their
laws by exercising only the “mild encouragement” that Dole
sanctions.276 Congress should ensure that the amount of money
conditioned on the states’ adoption of the federal gun bans and
creation of gun units is not so substantial as to leave the states
with no choice but to follow Congress’s directive.277
B. CONGRESS SHOULD ESTABLISH STATE REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
To effectuate the work of the gun units, Congress should
impose reporting requirements on state and local authorities.
In Printz, Justice O’Connor stated that Congress may constitutionally mandate states to report information to the federal
government, for example.278 O’Connor specified that federal
laws that require local law enforcement agencies to report cases
of missing children to the DOJ remain constitutional.279 Congress should assert the power it retained under Printz by requiring states to report domestic violence misdemeanants and
persons subject to orders for protection to the DOJ.
Access to information about the number of domestic violence misdemeanor convictions and state-issued orders for protection would enable Congress to distribute the proposed grants
appropriately. To establish a reporting requirement, Congress
could look to the Hate Crimes Statistic Act (HCSA) of 1990280
as a model. The HCSA requires the DOJ to obtain data from lo273. 483 U.S. at 210.
274. Id. at 210–11.
275. See May, supra note 24, at 9 (recognizing that batterers are “not a protected group” and that courts have found that batterers who lose their employment as a result of the firearm bans have no legally cognizable defense to
remedy this consequence).
276. 483 U.S. at 211.
277. See id.
278. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
279. Id.
280. Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2000)).
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cal law enforcement agencies concerning incidents of hate
crimes.281 An amendment to VAWA would impose a similar reporting requirement on state law enforcement agencies for domestic violence. Like the HCSA, the VAWA amendment would
instruct the DOJ to publish an annual summary of its findings.282 Congress could access this information to strategically
appropriate grant money to areas where instances of abuse are
high.
Reporting requirements would also help local gun units
apprehend and disarm batterers. For instance, Congress could
stipulate that states accept the grants on the condition that
court personnel promptly enroll prohibited persons in the National Instant Check System (NICS).283 NICS is an electronic
database established as part of the Brady Act in 1998.284 Federally licensed gun dealers must use NICS to conduct criminal
background checks on all firearm purchasers.285 Currently,
many states do not enter their protective orders in the NICS
system.286 By compelling states to report information about
abusers, disarmament would be more likely because abusers’
domestic violence records would prevent them from purchasing
a gun.287
In addition, Congress could stipulate that grant recipients
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(IX)(b) (Supp. 2006) (“The administrative office of the courts shall enter information regarding the protective orders into the state database which shall be made available to police and sheriff
departments statewide.”); Sack, supra note 35, at 20 (stating that New York
law requires courts to notify the statewide registry of protection orders);
BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 6 (noting that California courts have provided information on almost one quarter of a million restraining orders to the
NICS system).
284. See Brady Campaign, Gun Laws Work, Loopholes Don’t, http://www
.bradycampaign.org/facts/issues/?page=loop (last visited Jan. 28, 2007). NICS
draws on information entered in the National Crime Information Center database (NCIC). BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 3.
285. See Karan & Stampalia, supra note 35, at 81 (describing how firearm
dealers in Florida must conduct background checks on NCIC); BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 9.
286. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 3 (stating that in June 2003,
the NCIC registery of protective orders contained only 781,574 entries, estimated to be less than half of the over two million protective orders that qualify
for entry).
287. See id. California and a few other states already provide information
on restraining orders to NICS. See id. at 6. In 2001, however, only eleven percent of the sixty-four million state criminal history records available nationwide were instantly accessible through NICS. Id. at 7.
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report state firearm license records.288 An investigator could
then look at the license records to determine if an individual
has a prior record of gun acquisition.289 The investigator would
compare this report to the individual’s NICS entry,290 identify
prohibited persons who are likely to own firearms, and catch
defendants who falsely testify that they do not own guns. Access to license records would also help identify prohibited persons who purchase guns from private gun dealers. These dealers are not legally required to conduct an NICS background
check.291 An investigator’s knowledge of an individual’s gun license may raise a red flag, prompting the investigator to find
out if the person does own a gun illegally. Creating incentives
for states to report this information will help gun units close
the gaps that permit batterers to remain armed.
C. THE BENEFITS OF PROVIDING FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR THE
STATES TO DISARM BATTERERS
While the proposed federal grant program may not provide
a foolproof solution for protecting women from gun violence, it
would substantially improve current approaches to disarming
batterers. Under this solution, the combined use of federal and
state law would avoid the problems of the state sovereignty
paradigm while preserving important elements of federalism
doctrine. Enticing the states to adopt federal law as a minimum
requirement would rebut the presumption that domestic violence is a private matter not worthy of national attention.292
Congress would preserve its historic role in regulating domestic
relations by promoting a federal grant program that establishes
a uniform, nationwide requirement for disarming batterers.
This solution would also preserve a role for state governments
as laboratories,293 giving states freedom to devise creative pol288. See id. at 8.
289. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12010(a) (West. Supp. 2007) (“The Attorney
General shall establish and maintain an online database to be known as the
Prohibited Armed Persons File. The purpose of the file is to cross-reference
persons who have ownership or possession of a firearm . . . as indicated by a
record in the Consolidated Firearms Information System, and who, subsequent to the date of that ownership or possession of a firearm, fall within a
class of persons who are prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm.”).
290. See BRADY CAMPAIGN, supra note 139, at 8.
291. Id. at 9.
292. See Legal Responses, supra note 194, at 1543.
293. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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icy solutions to address gun violence against women, provided
they do not fall below the minimum requirement.
The federal grants would also diminish the likelihood that
judicial and prosecutorial discretion could obfuscate the purpose of the gun bans. By stipulating that judges follow a standard disarmament process, the grants would better enable victim advocates and counsel to discover when a judge strays from
the guidelines. The creation of citizen watchdog groups could
increase public oversight of judicial decisions. Prosecutors
might continue to seek plea deals with defendants to avoid going to trial, but the public’s increased courtroom observation
could stir negative publicity over a local prosecutor’s habit of
cutting deals with defendants. As a result, the public may refuse to reelect state or county attorneys. In the face of losing
their elected offices, state or county attorneys may reform
prosecutors’ practices by limiting a prosecutor’s ability to make
plea deals or by requiring that plea deals include an order to
disarm.
Additionally, the creation of state gun units would establish the physical and bureaucratic infrastructure necessary to
remove the guns. If states had the resources to disarm batterers, many batterers would voluntarily disarm in the face of the
real possibility that a State may force them to do so. Even if an
individual refused to comply, the improved ability of investigators to access data identifying prohibited persons and their
guns would increase disarmament.
If the disarmament system failed or became inadequate,
the public would be more likely to hold state and federal legislators accountable. If a state enacted the federal gun bans as its
own law, it would be less likely to blame Congress for improper
enforcement since this duty would be its own. The reporting requirements would increase public awareness of states that do
not confiscate guns at the same rate as other jurisdictions.
Constituents could use such data to rally federal legislators to
offer greater assistance to those states, thereby holding Congress responsible for enforcing a uniform nationwide standard.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of this solution must be
judged from the perspective of battered women. To do so, it is
worth considering how such a solution could have changed Teri
Lee’s life.294 While the tragic circumstances surrounding the
Lee family may be attributed to a myriad of failed social and
294. See supra text accompanying notes 1–21.
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government interventions, it is nevertheless important to ask,
Would Teri Lee be alive today had Van Keuren been disarmed?
If Minnesota had adopted the federal gun bans and created
gun units, the Lee case could have unfolded differently. Once
the judge issued the criminal no contact order against Van
Keuren, immediate steps would have been taken to disarm
him. The judge would have asked whether Van Keuren owned a
gun, informing both him and Teri Lee that he could no longer
possess one under state and federal law. As a condition of his
release, the judge would have required Van Keuren to give up
his firearms at a local gun repository within forty-eight hours.
A victim advocate would have met with Teri Lee to determine
ways to keep her and her family safe, perhaps by staying at a
battered women’s shelter. If Van Keuren had not complied with
the order, officers in the local gun unit would have been notified immediately. The officers then could have arrested and disarmed Van Keuren. Any one of these interventions could have
resulted in Van Keuren’s disarmament. By giving Teri Lee the
full support of state judicial and law enforcement bodies, Teri
Lee would not have had to defend herself and her children
alone.
CONCLUSION
In light of the violence women continue to face, the federal
government’s recent efforts to assume responsibility for domestic violence should be supported. However, the public must
critically analyze current approaches to gun violence to assure
the best solution. Most importantly, the public must hold Congress accountable for the legislature’s misguided habit of acquiescing to states’ presumed sovereignty over domestic relations.
To end the alarming amount of violence faced by women across
the country, Congress must influence local action to the maximum of its constitutional ability. By providing monetary incentives to the states to adopt the federal gun bans, create gun
units, and follow reporting requirements, Congress can effectively establish a uniform, national approach to combating domestic violence. This approach would recognize the federal government’s unique capacity to provide a national solution and
would affirm the importance of enabling women to live free
from violence.

